Missiles are reshaping warfare, making conflicts faster, cheaper, and more political. A limited volley of conventional missiles can paralyse a country, disrupt critical infrastructure, and complicate decision-making. With China having deployed more than 200 conventional missile launchers opposite India, the key question is how this missile superiority could shape a future conflict.
China’s arsenal
While India views conventional missiles primarily as deterrents, China sees them as instruments of both political coercion and war-fighting. The threat of missile strikes alone may achieve strategic objectives without triggering a full-scale war. A barrage targeting critical infrastructure deep inside India could force New Delhi to fight on two fronts: a border conflict and a missile campaign against its hinterland.
The two missile bases located at Korla and Kunming can fire a range of conventional missiles (DF-15B, DF-16, DF-21C and DF-26). DF-15B, DF-16 and DF-21C are most suited to hit military targets along the borders; whereas the DF-26 can hit high-value targets in depth. Further, their hypersonic missiles (DF-100 and CJ-1000) can hit deeper, with no launch warning. This becomes a major vulnerability, as India has no reliable defence against it.
Consequently, China’s inventory reduces the salience of the Himalayas to provide strategic depth. The DF-26, being dual-role, raises the risk of escalation. While China shoots down from the Tibetan Plateau, India has to shoot over the Himalayas. This impacts missile detection timings. Moreover, India’s missile inventory is still evolving, with limitations in both range and diversity. Its long-range systems — including Agni, the Long-Range Land Attack Cruise Missile (LR-LACM) — Nirbhay, and BrahMos — and their variants are yet to be fully integrated. India also lacks robust real-time targeting capabilities, has finite missile stockpiles, and is still developing its hypersonic technology. Importantly, its rocket force remains a conceptual construct, with significant policy and organisational issues yet to be resolved.
Without a rocket force, India would have little choice but to absorb a Chinese missile strike. On the contrary, if India has one, both get hurt to varying degrees. That is when the missile math kicks in – in terms of mutual vulnerability. If China launches 100 missiles, India must be able to inflict significant damage — not necessarily through equal numbers, but through comparable effects. India should therefore aim to build a credible conventional missile inventory; otherwise, it risks being forced into a stalemate even before the border war begins.
Ideally, India’s rocket force should deliver three effects. First, it should be able to hold the PLA’s Western Theatre Command (WTC) at risk by having the threat to target deep inside Tibet and Xinjiang. Second, it should be capable of degrading the PLA’s road and rail infrastructure, airbases, and logistics installations along the border. Third, it must enable field commanders to strike PLA camps, gun positions, and ammunition dumps in the tactical battle area. In essence, India needs a rocket force capable of engaging strategic, operational, and tactical military and economic targets from a single command authority.
Three aspects are important. First, at the doctrinal level, India must adopt counter-value strikes as part of its conventional missile strategy. This would require rethinking the scope and scale of its counter-force doctrine and developing a unified target list. Service- or agency-specific target lists have little place in time-sensitive missile warfare. The rocket force must also have the authority to execute pre-designated precautionary strikes in the opening hours of a conflict. Without pre-delegated launch authority, India would risk defeat at the outset.
Second, at the structural level, whatever blueprint is adopted for the rocket force, it must be placed under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Keeping it service-specific would undermine operational effectiveness. India must also expand its medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM/IRBM) inventory, including Agni variants, to hold targets such as Korla and Kunming at reciprocal risk. This would raise the costs of any Chinese use of the DF-26. Fast-tracking the development of hypersonic missiles is vital, especially since the DF-100 is already part of the PLA Rocket Force’s order of battle (ORBAT).
Third, at the technological level, India’s missile industry faces significant challenges. Private sector participation must expand to complement the efforts of the DRDO. Major missile programmes have suffered from cost overruns and delays, while critical gaps in advanced air propulsion systems, semiconductors, and high-grade materials continue to hamper self-reliance. Dependence on foreign suppliers for high-end components remains a strategic vulnerability. Greater investment in R&D and end-to-end private-sector manufacturing will be essential.
Interim steps
Since a rocket force will take time to become operational, India must adopt interim measures. First, disperse IAF assets and harden airbases to reduce vulnerability and force an adversary to expend more missiles. Second, optimise air-defence deployment to compel the PLA Rocket Force to target the air-defences rather than critical infrastructure. Third, strengthen long-range conventional strike capabilities to hold targets in Tibet and Xinjiang at risk, creating reciprocal vulnerability. Finally, expand satellite surveillance to detect mobile launchers, particularly DF-26 systems, improving the chances of early neutralisation.
Suffice it to say that if China believes that it can wage a successful conventional missile campaign, India must convince it otherwise by demonstrating credible options below the nuclear threshold. India should therefore reset its doctrinal and structural approach to build a credible conventional rocket force capable of deterring — or, if necessary, prevailing in — a missile war on either front.
Harinder Singh, a retired Lieutenant General, is an independent analyst
Published - June 30, 2026 12:08 am IST
